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Matti Hyvärinen 
Travelling Metaphors, Transforming Concepts 
This volume discusses the travelling concepts of narrative.  But what do we 
understand by “travelling concepts”?  I address this issue by reading Mieke Bal, 
who originally suggested the term, and by scrutinizing the metaphor of travel itself.  
Do we assume that the concept of narrative has remained the same over the course 
of its travels?  The chapter suggests that there are many levels to consider in using 
the term travellers: the abstract idea and metaphor of narrative, the concept, the 
narrative theory.  Instead of mere travel, the concept of narrative itself has changed, 
often covertly, but with substantial consequences.  The chapter discusses the 
difference between top-down and bottom-up approaches to narrativity in social 
research.  The metaphorical discourse on narrative has enlarged the concept’s range 
of reference substantially and too far afield for many commentators, while keeping 
the criteria of the concept formal and conventional.  The end of the chapter 
examines these narrative metaphors of life critically, finally by discussing the 
manner in which Ian McEwan’s novel On Chesil Beach thematizes and contests 
ubiquity and portability of narrative as a concept and metaphor.   
This chapter is the third part of my recent interventions into the study of the narrative 
turns.  Instead of a single narrative turn, I suggest the relevance of at least four distinct 
turns to narrative with different research agendas, narrative languages and appraisals of 
narrative (Hyvärinen, 2010).  The narrative turn in literature, with its structuralist 
programme and scientific rhetoric, took place from the 1960s to the 1970s and 
consolidated its position as the mainstream of literary scholarship.  The narrativist turn in 
historiography in the 1970s focused on the critique of the narrative form of representing 
the historical past.  The third turn, in social sciences, education and psychology, began in 
the early 1980s.  In contrast to the two earlier turns, the dominant tone of this third turn 
was both anti-positivistic and hermeneutical.  Parallel to this third turn, one can also 
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detect a broader cultural turn to narrative in media and politics.  Building on this scheme, 
Hyvärinen (2012a) explores further the historical relevance of certain narrative 
prototypes (Proppian, Aristotelian) in narrative thought.  Since Roland Barthes’ (1977) 
famous lines on the ubiquitous nature of narrative, a contrast has prevailed between the 
abstract and universal promise of the concept and the particularly narrow genres (e.g. 
Russian wonder tales) that have functioned as prototypes of narrative.   
 
This chapter shifts the focus to the metaphor of travel itself.  Is it the term (word), 
concept, theory or metaphor of narrative that travels most efficiently?  In contrast to the 
term, the concept endures fundamental change and diversification during these travels.  In 
comparison with the two earlier articles focusing on the historical aspect of the turns, the 
orientation of this chapter is more prescriptive and uses the history of concepts approach 
as its method of critique, particularly while discussing the metaphoric discourse.   
 
The chapter proceeds by first discussing the relevance of its conceptual approach.  Next it 
turns towards concrete examples and documents important conceptual changes since the 
first narrative turn in literature.  After discussing the particularly narrow concept of 
Hayden White, the chapter portrays one postmodernist attempt at conceptual purification.  
Then the focus turns towards the powerful metaphorical discourse in social research, 
which is re-evaluated from the perspective of the ‘postclassical’ understanding of 
narrative.  The last section finally tests the relevance of the metaphorical discourse by 
reading Ian McEwan’s novel On Chesil Beach.    
 
Travelling with Mieke Bal 
 
The title of this volume owes a great deal to Mieke Bal’s book Travelling Concepts in the 
Humanities.  Therefore it is more than appropriate to commence with discussing some of 
her ideas (Bal, 2002).  In introducing her term ‘travelling concepts’, Bal is foremost 
concerned with the phenomenon of widespread transdisciplinary work in the humanities 
– a parallel issue we are dealing with in this book.  While working increasingly within 
interdisciplinary settings and projects, we face the genuine problem of academic costs.  
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However, Bal continues, by “cost I do not mean anything economic.  I mean the high 
costs involved in such obvious endeavours as getting the basics, reading the classics, and 
working through one’s own methodological toolbox” (p. 3).  This is a sobering remark 
during times of easy interdisciplinary hype and should be remembered on every occasion 
that we advertise narrative travels or the celebrated interdisciplinary field of narrative 
studies.   
 
How, then, to reduce the necessary costs?  Differing from cultural anthropology, Bal’s 
‘cultural analysis’ does not presume such a preset ‘field’ as the culture of a distant village 
to be charted but, firstly, almost always needs to be construed and negotiated.  Cultural 
analysis is a term Bal prefers to cultural studies.  For reasons of convenience, I presume 
that outside the study of one particular text, novel, short story or drama, narrative 
scholars regularly face similar problems of outlining first the field of the study.1  If the 
field of the study is indefinite, methods will not provide much alleviation from the 
problem:  
 
Nor are its methods sitting in a toolbox waiting to be applied; they, too, are part of 
the exploration.  You don’t apply one method; you conduct a meeting between 
several, a meeting in which the object participates, so that, together, object and 
methods can became a new, not firmly delineated, field.  (p. 4) 
 
To further this dilemma and to emphasize its relevance, I suggest that we probably never 
just ‘apply’ a method without its local customization to the problems and materials at 
hand.  With narrative studies in social sciences, the fallacy of method regularly appears in 
formulations such as “I study X by asking people to tell narratives about X and then 
conduct narrative analyses on the material.”  The quandary of this formula is its way to 
reduce narrative merely into a representation of the world ‘out there.’  Instead, I propose 
that narratives, if interesting at all, are always already in the world, constituting the very 
                                                 
1 For example, there is far more literature about narrative and narrative studies than I will ever be able to 
read, not to mention study carefully.  There are too many languages, too many genres of literature.  Yet I 
should keep the field of my “conceptual history of narrative” somehow compact, relevant and 
communicable.   
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world, and we should rather be interested in existing ‘narrative environments’ and 
ongoing local ‘narrative practices’ (Gubrium & Holstein, 2008).  It is easy to agree with 
Bal, methods indeed do not solve the problem.   
 
Having expressed her hesitation with methods, Bal arrives at her “extremely simple” 
conclusion by proposing that “interdisciplinarity in the humanities, necessary, exciting, 
serious, must seek its heuristic and methodological basis in concepts rather than methods” 
(p. 5).  It is noteworthy that Bal does not suggest, as her primary recommendation, for 
example, going back to ‘theory’ or ‘philosophical backgrounds’, both being legitimate 
and fundamental elements of study.  Reducing costs, Bal seems to think, will be best 
realized with a systematic focus on key concepts.  What she recommends, however, is not 
just abstract conceptual analysis but “[r]ethinking the use and meaning of concepts as a 
methodological principle” (p. 10).  She emphasizes that she is not interested in concepts 
“as firmly established univocal terms but as dynamic in themselves.”  And specifically: 
“Not because they mean the same thing for everyone, but because they don’t” (p. 11).   
 
So far, I have travelled happily with Bal.  Bal’s discussion quite obviously supports the 
conceptual focus of this volume.  She equally encourages registering the conceptual 
variety and the actual uses of the concept.  Nevertheless, I have some places yet to visit, 
new travels yet to make.  Quentin Skinner, one of the most distinguished contemporary 
historians of political thought, has for a long time investigated the historical change of 
political and intellectual concepts (Skinner, 1988 offers a short summary of his ideas).  
Skinner explicitly rejects the general idea of focusing on the “meaning” of a concept.  
Three entirely different aspects of meaning may change when a concept is changed: 
firstly, and most obviously, the criteria of a concept may change.  This aspect is activated 
concerning divergent definitions of a concept.  We may discuss, for example, whether 
narratives always portray a clear sequence of events, from a beginning to an end, or 
whether it is enough that they “cue” the receiver to make inferences on particular events.  
Secondly, Skinner suggests the changed range of references.  Before the first narrative 
turn in the 1960s, ‘narrative’ was employed only in a limited and particular sense.  
Roland Barthes famously suggested its broader applicability in his celebrated 1966 article 
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(Barthes, 1977), but the most radical move from the level of representation to the 
ontological aspects of living took place in the 1980s, after the narrative turn in social 
sciences and psychology (Hyvärinen, 2010, 2012a).  Narrative was attached to living, 
personality and social relationships.  Jerome Bruner, for example, has never challenged 
the definitions of narrative; nevertheless he was one of those who thoroughly changed 
what can now be legitimately called ‘narrative’ (Bruner, 1987, 1990).   
 
Skinner takes one further step away from the abstract ‘meaning’ of concepts.  He 
suggests that the range of possible appraisals of a concept can also change over time.  
For the narrativist school of historiography and many critics of narrative research, 
narratives as such are ideologically worrisome (White, 1981; Hyvärinen, 2010, 2012a, 
2012b).  Indeed, it is frequently presumed that we should, instead, advance storytelling, 
that one necessary part of narrative research itself consists of a researcher’s own personal 
storytelling (Ellis & Bochner, 2000).  This aspect of changing appraisals is intimately 
connected to the imagined context and community of narrative theory and research.  
Galen Strawson, in his full-scale attack on narrative studies, suggested the useful term of 
“narrative camp” (Strawson, 2004).  Instead of bolstering up the narrative camp (as a 
movement inspired by the narrative turns) and fighting its fights against diverse enemies, 
I argue for a slightly different attitude of moderately de-camping narrative studies.  One 
aspect of this attitude of de-camping is a resistance to conventional redemption and quest 
narratives told about narrative turns and theory, and a readiness for a reflective re-
assessment of the tradition of narrative research itself (as Brian Schiff, for example, is 
doing in terms of narrative psychology is this volume, as is Olivia Guaraldo in terms of 
the storytelling practices of Italian feminism).   
 
After visiting Skinner, in any case, I now have some concerns about the metaphor of 
travel.  Who is the traveller, to begin with?  Narrative theories themselves have 
characteristically been relatively slow to travel.  For example, the conceptual distinction 
between ‘narrative discourse’ and ‘story’, so fundamental for structuralist narratology, 
never completely arrived on the side of social sciences.  In case we think that concepts 
travel, do we, by the same token, presume that it is the very same and solid concept of 
 6 
narrative which, having departed from literary narratology, finally arrived, firstly at 
historiography and then at social and psychological research in the 1980s?  This is most 
certainly not true.  I have earlier discussed these travels in terms of powerful 
(Aristotelian, Proppian, Labovian) narrative prototypes (Hyvärinen, 2012a) and in terms 
of narrative as a metaphor or ‘empty signifier’ (Hyvärinen, 2006).  ‘Travel’, as Kai 
Mikkonen (2007, p. 286) reminds us, is itself a conventional narrative metaphor.  With all 
this talk about travel, it is better not to be enchanted by romantic quest stories or indeed 
to think that there has been, all along, one distinct if not distinguished traveller with one 
story to be told.   
 
Tasting the difference 
 
At this point, many a reader may think with exhaustion: “All this is nothing but airy 
speculation.  We all know what ‘story’ and ‘narrative’ mean, and I don’t have any 
problems in understanding what writers meant by these terms a hundred, and why not, 
several hundred years ago.  I suspect you cannot give us any examples of changes that 
really matter!”   
 
The same word, to begin with, does not indicate the same concept or the same content in 
different times and different contexts.2  Anachronism – the attribution of a contemporary 
set of ideas to old terms – is exactly what such scholars as Skinner and Reinhart 
Koselleck (2004) have criticized through their history of concepts approach.  Yet, the 
question about relevant conceptual changes cries out for more concrete answers, and I 
will next try to provide some.   
 
Louis Mink (1921 – 1983) was a historian and philosopher of history who pioneered the 
introduction of narrative thought into historiography in the 1970s.  Yet my discussion is 
not primarily based on the assumption of his particularly seminal position in theory 
building in his time, I rather consider him as a representative figure that condensed and 
                                                 
2 Concepts travel, of course, between philosophical traditions, superficially looking the same, but often 
having profoundly different connotations and connections.  Hanna Meretoja, in this volume, discusses 
many such travels.   
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expressed many important ideas of his time.  In one of his essays, first published in 1970, 
Mink explores critical answers to a challenge posed earlier by the literary scholar Barbara 
Hardy (1968).  Hardy might well be understood as one of the early predecessors of the 
later programme of ‘natural narratology’ (Fludernik, 1996).  She writes, in a somewhat 
poetic style, that “we dream in narrative, daydream in narrative, remember, anticipate, 
hope, despair, believe, doubt, plan, revise, criticize, construct, gossip, learn, hate, and 
love by narrative” (Hardy, 1968, p. 5).  Perhaps, there is a good deal of exaggeration built 
into her formulations.  Nevertheless, at the core of her argument, there is the simple claim 
that narrative and narrativity are very ordinary phenomena, embedded in the fabric of 
everyday existence, thought and communication.  For the sake of debate and clarity, I 
will call this idea ‘bottom-up-narrativity’.3   
 
Hardy did not define narrative in a new way.  She does not claim that people live 
narratives.  She rather attaches narrativity to all kinds of mental processes.  She extends 
the range of reference only moderately further than Barthes (1977) had already done.  
Hardy was able to provoke the heated discussion by simply changing the appraisal of 
narrative, by making it an ordinary phenomenon.  Because of this change of horizon, her 
essay may be one of the most radical and innovative proposals of narrative theory over 
the last forty years.  What can be portrayed as her radicality becomes perfectly visible in 
Mink’s response to her.  Mink is ready to accept narrative’s “primary and irreducible” 
role in the human mind and explanation (Mink, 1987, p. 59).  What turns him against 
Hardy is something entirely different:   
 
The comprehension at which narratives aim is a primary act of mind, although it is 
a capacity which can be indefinitely developed in range, clarity, and subtlety.  But 
to say that the qualities of narrative are transferred to art from life seems a hysteron 
proteron [a figure which changes temporal and/or causal order - MH].  Stories are 
                                                 
3 I am using the terms in a slightly different but related way than Nünning (2003) does.  The bottom-up 
analyses in social research are drawing heavily from the sociolinguistic tradition of William Labov (1972).  
The metaphorical discourse, instead, has privileged such top-down operations as categorizing whole 
narratives with the help of the Neo-Classical genre theory.  According to Nünning, classical narratology 
favoured the bottom-up approach, while the post-classical narratology rather uses the top-down approaches.  
I am not totally convinced of the latter part of the argument, though I would say that many poststructuralist 
approaches may indeed privilege the top-down perspective.   
 8 
not lived but told.  Life has no beginnings, middles, or ends; there are meetings, but 
the start of an affair belongs to the story we tell ourselves later, and there are 
partings, but final parting only in story.  (1987, p. 60) 
 
I leave the – equally interesting – latter part of the quote for a moment and ask you to 
reflect on the two first sentences for a while.  With reasonable reservations, one can find 
distant resemblances with the much more recent debate between natural (Fludernik, 1996; 
Herman, 2009a) and unnatural narratology (Iversen, this volume).  In Mink’s words, 
narrative comprehension “can be indefinitely developed in range, clarity, and subtlety”.   
This subtlety is something that Hardy’s natural and everyday narrative minding cannot 
genuinely reach.  It is not difficult to fully endorse the sense and relevance of the 
warnings against the naïve narrative historiography that Mink portrays.  Stories do not 
exist for him out there before the actual, constructive telling.  However, his 
methodological advice at the end of the essay is worth further critical attention: 
 
So it seems truer to say that narrative qualities are transferred from art to life.  We 
could learn to tell stories of our lives from nursery rhymes, or from culture-myths if 
we had any, but it is from history and fiction that we can learn how to tell and to 
understand complex stories, and how it is that stories answer questions.  (p. 60, 
emphasis added) 
  
The changing range of “clarity and subtlety” dictates that genuine narrative qualities flow 
from art and historiography to everyday life.  The open elitism of this claim is 
breathtaking.  Is it Great Men, the Greek Classics or Tradition that, in the beginning of 
time, allocated these qualities to the arts and to historians?  The logic of Mink’s argument 
cannot but appear as flawed, as far as the arts are considered to be an integral part of life.  
There is no one-directional narrative traffic from the arts to everyday life, as little as there 
can be any simple one-directional causality from everyday life narratives to the most 
unnatural and complex literary stories (Mildorf, 2006, 2008; and this volume, discusses 
such effects of everyday narration).  However, what is the most astonishing feature 
within this short exchange is Mink’s almost total rejection of the autonomous 
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significance and relatively autonomous qualities of everyday narrativity, that is, our 
specific human capacity to use narrative.   
  
In other words, Mink is generous enough to accept most of the extended range of 
narrative’s reference but only at the price of introducing a strict hierarchy of appraisal.  
Mink ridicules the idea that dreams could be narratives (they can, of course, for several 
reasons) and suggests that children can possibly learn narratives “from nursery rhymes, 
or from culture-myths if we had any” (p. 60).  Note that neither of these narrative sources 
even distantly resembles the ordinary small stories that Alexandra Georgakopoulou and 
Jarmila Mildorf investigate in this volume.  Mink’s everyday narrative blueprints belong 
to such pseudo-oral, mythical stories that Vladimir Propp (1968) had made popular and 
Monika Fludernik (1996, p. 14) later criticizes.  For some reason, it seems to be almost 
unbearable to recognize the particular characteristics and functions of oral stories (I will 
return to these functions more specifically while discussing narrative metaphors).  If not 
directly from the arts, narrative capacities flow from myths and deep conventionality.   
 
In a later essay, Mink continues his reflections on narrative structures and explores the 
relationship between fiction and history.  In this context, he suggests an important new 
idiom by writing about “the very idea of narrative form itself” (Mink, 1987, p. 186, 
emphasis added).  “The narrative form itself” seems to embody the core of the previous 
“narrative qualities […] transferred from art to life” (p. 60).  This observation leads Mink 
to think that 
 
Aristotle’s comment that every story has a beginning, a middle, and an end is not 
merely a truism.  It commands universal assent while failing to tell us anything 
new, simply because it makes explicit part of the conceptual framework underlying 
the capacity to tell and hear stories of any sort.  And in making a presupposition 
explicit it has implications that are far from banal; it makes clear that our 
experience of life does not necessarily have the form of narrative, except as we give 
it that form by making it the subject of stories.  (p. 186, emphasis added) 
 
 10 
At the end of the day we have a narrative that is a form which commands universal assent 
(possibly excluding Barbara Hardy and her ilk) and which is most elegantly written down 
by Aristotle.  Narrative as a form, resorting to the Saussurean langue, cannot but flow 
from above (the arts and historiography) and from the distant past (from Aristotle and 
myths) to the ordinary users.  This idea of narrative as a fixed form is almost 
unanimously rejected later in postclassical narratology (Alber & Fludernik, 2010) as well 
as in most social research on narrative.  However, in a guest lecture in Helsinki, Finland, 
on 9 May 2012, Hayden White confirmed the same narrativist orientation by saying that 
 
… modern narratological theory holds that narrative (like any discursive genre or 
mode) is itself a “content” in the same way that the proverbial bottle meant to 
contain new wine is already possessed of a content or substance even prior to its 
filling.  (2012, p. 23) 
 
A naïve test question: why should anyone who shares this vision of the “modern 
narratological theory” bother reading novels, well knowing that the “new wine is already 
possessed of a content” of the form?  The practitioners of this theory themselves cannot 
but be deeply masochistic, tasting the “possessed” content day in, day out and even by 
making a living out of eternally returning to the same rancid content.4  White’s image of 
the structuralist narratology as mere research of the content of the form is curiously 
narrow.  It is not difficult to decipher two almost opposite research orientations towards 
‘structure’ within structuralist narratology: research into the narrative structures and 
research into the structure of narrative.  Quite unanimously, the project was interested in 
the various narrative structures (in contrast to interpretation or content, for example).  A 
different and more particular agenda entirely was based on the Proppian analyses of 
Russian wonder tales and the consequent aspiration to map and describe the unmovable 
‘narrative grammar’ on the deep level of ‘langue’ (see Ronen, 1990).  Had structuralist 
narratology focused solely on the study of narrative form, it would have remained a 
                                                 
4 White might possibly respond by saying: “This is a total misunderstanding.  Modern and postmodern 
literature is not narrative.”  I leave the dispute to be solved by my literary colleagues working within The 
International Society for the Study of Narrative (ISSN), previously referred to as the International Society 
for the Study of Narrative Literature.   
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relatively marginal project in the study of literature.  Mink and White are 
characteristically fixated on this later way of thinking and theorize exclusively in terms of 
the consequences for a singular “narrative form”,5 without any thorough analysis of the 
varieties of narrative forms and, thus, of the innumerable ways that narratives can and do 





My second intervention regarding a potential conceptual change is triggered by a passage 
from Dominick LaCapra’s Writing History, Writing Trauma (LaCapra, 2001).  As the 
title already reveals, LaCapra explores in his essays the possibilities and limits of writing 
ethically about such traumatic experiences as Shoah.  For many years, I have primarily 
read this passage as a critique of Hayden White and as a corroboration of my own 
disposition to understand narrative differently.  However, should we rather take 
LaCapra’s astonishment seriously, as a true question, as a sign of confusing discrepancy?  
LaCapra’s question is this: 
 
As noted earlier, not all narratives are conventional, and the history of significant 
modern literature is in good part that of largely nonconventional narratives –
narratives that may well explore problems of absence and loss.  It is curious that 
theorists who know much better nonetheless seem to assume the most conventional 
form of narrative (particularly nineteenth-century realism read in a rather limited 
manner) when they generalize about the nature of narrative, often to criticize its 
conventionalizing or ideological nature.  (LaCapra, 2001, p. 63, emphasis added) 
 
LaCapra opens his question by a matter-of-fact empirical observation about the 
differences between narratives.  Why is it that some authors do not recognize 
unconventional narratives at all?  One author who indeed should have known better is the 
                                                 
5 Note also that White, in the quote above, considers narrative as a “discursive genre”.  Barthes (1977, 79) 
already saw it differently in terms of a “prodigious variety of genres.”  The difference is vast and sets in 
motion consequences of a very different nature.   
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philosopher Galen Strawson (2004).  Strawson, who rigorously divides persons into two 
categories, ‘narrative’ (diachronic) and ‘episodic’ characters, finds his prototypes of 
narrative persons from among philosophers (Plato, Heidegger), whereas his episodic 
persons are amazingly found from among the ranks of novelists (Murdoch, Woolf).  In 
other words, Strawson finds more narrative personalities from philosophy than from the 
modernist literature.  In a similar way, White (2012) regularly finds his privileged allies 
against the miseries of (narrative) historiography from among the cohorts of modernist 
writers.  In contrast to LaCapra, who has the option of unconventional narratives, White 
portrays modernist writers as anti-narrative: 
 
The rejection (diminution, avoidance, abandonment) of narrative, narration, and 
narrativization, which is characteristic of literary modernism, then appears as a 
response in the domain of the symbolic to such fantasies and an index of a will to 
realism rather than that “irrationalism” which modernism is conventionally 
supposed to incarnate.  (2012, p. 24, italics changed) 
 
The problems of understanding White (and equally Strawson), I argue, result largely from 
his very particular way of conceptualizing narrative.  To begin with, White completely 
shares Mink’s top-down vision of narrativity.  In so far as he continues criticizing 
historicity and historical narratives, he continues to rely as a matter of belief on the 
everlasting dominance of the trans-historical categories drawn from Neo-Classical genre 
theory (see Bawarshi & Reiff, 2010, p. 15), and simply thinks that the historian who 
“narrativizes” past events has to do so by choosing “a plot-structure” from the inherited 
and context-free list of tragedy, comedy, romance and irony/satire (White, 1978, p. 67).  
In short, while he criticizes historians and narratives for “temporalizing” past events, his 
own understanding of narrative form is largely based on the quasi-eternal effects of past 
literary genres and conventions.  But the conceptual particularities reach even deeper.6   
 
                                                 
6 In the following section, I draw heavily (and directly) from my discussion in an earlier article on W.G. 
Sebald’s novel Rings of Saturn (Hyvärinen 2012b).   
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One source of these confusions may be located in the way the structuralists Emile 
Benveniste (1971), Gérard Genette (1976) and White (1981) have both distinguished and 
opposed ‘narrative’ and ‘discourse’ linguistically.  By taking his examples from the  
nineteenth-century realist novel and the historiography of the same period, Benveniste 
outlined a conception of purely chronological narrative of the past world, told in third 
person.  He argued that a whole array of linguistic forms such as ‘I’, ‘you’, and other 
deictic references to the writing moment were strictly excluded from the ‘narrative’ 
mode, whereas the French form of the aorist was typical for this narrative ‘in the strict 
sense’.  “The tenses of a French verb are not employed as members of a single system; 
they are distributed in two systems which are distinct and complementary”, Benveniste 
(p. 206) argues.  The “historical utterance” that narrates the past has a particular form: 
 
It is sufficient and necessary that the author remain faithful to his historical purpose 
and that he proscribe everything that is alien to the narration of events (discourse, 
reflections, comparisons).  As a matter of fact, there is then no longer even a 
narrator.  The events are set forth chronologically, as they occurred.  No one 
speaks here; the events seem to narrate themselves.  The fundamental tense is the 
aorist, which is the tense of the event outside the person of a narrator.  (p. 208, 
emphasis added) 
 
Genette remarks that Benveniste includes “in the category of discourse all that Aristotle 
calls direct imitation” (1976, p. 8).  The examples Benveniste and Genette offer come 
from the historian Glotz and from Balzac.  “In discourse, someone speaks and his 
situation in the very act of speaking is the focus of the most important signification.  In 
narrative, as Benveniste insists, no one speaks, in the sense that at no moment do we have 
to ask ‘Who is speaking?’ ‘Where?’ ‘When?’ etc., in order to receive fully the meaning 
of the text,” argues Genette (p. 10).  All kinds of first-person narration, of course, falls 
into this language within ‘discourse,’ but also such third-person forms that foreground the 
narrator.  What is currently, after Labov and Waletzky (1967/97), discussed in terms of 
oral storytelling could only be understood in terms of discourse in the terminology of 
Benveniste.  Genette even suggests a difference of “naturalness” between these modes: 
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Actually, discourse has no purity to preserve because it is the natural mode of 
language, the broadest and most universal mode, by definition open to all forms.  
On the contrary, narrative is a particular mode, marked and defined by a certain 
number of exclusions and restrictive conditions (no present tense, no first person, 
etc.) Discourse can “narrate” without ceasing to be discourse.  Narrative can’t 
“discourse” without betraying itself.  (Genette, 1976, p. 11, emphasis added) 
  
As a matter of fact, Genette says here that oral, every-day narration (‘discourse’) is 
indeed a ‘natural’ form of language use while ‘narrative’ is not.  In his Narrative 
Discourse, Genette has already rejected the artificial idea of dividing texts categorically 
into discourse and narrative (or story).  As he says, “the level of narrative discourse is the 
only one directly available to textual analysis” (Genette, 1980, p. 27, emphasis added), 
meaning that the earlier distinction no longer applies.  The mere title of the English 
translation blends these earlier separate worlds.  Story now refers to “the succession of 
events…that are the subjects of the discourse,” not to a purified and particular linguistic 
form (p. 25).  However, White builds his criticism of narrative and “narrativization” 
precisely on the earlier distinction between discourse and narrative and never openly 
replaces it with the newer Genettian model (White, 1981).   
 
Ever since Plato and Aristotle, literary theorists have made the important distinction 
between mimesis (imitation) and diegesis (narration in past tense) or, in more 
contemporary terms, between the modes of showing and telling (Rabinowitz, 2005).  
Most narrative theorists take for granted that what they call ‘narratives’ may include both 
of these modes, whereas White clearly includes only the mode of telling within his 
narrative.  Modernist literature is famous for its privilege of showing, a fact that White 
reads exclusively as a sign of criticism of narrative.  Similarly, the extended passages of 
showing and staying inside a moment in modernist literature convince Strawson about the 
authors’ episodicality.  The distinction between showing and telling is both useful and 
productive in several ways, yet my claim is that White and Strawson make too much of it 
conceptually by using it as a means to purify narrative from the mode of showing.   
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If we take one more step and consider narrative thought in social sciences and 
psychology, the narrow conception of narrative (as opposite to that of discourse) becomes 
even harder to understand.  The pure mode of telling in third person and past tense 
appears indeed as a rather unnatural form of discourse as Genette suggested (1967, p. 11).  
The every-day, bottom-up stories are not primarily constructed by following the mythical 
models or Russian wonder tales, neither do they exhibit long sections in the style of 
nineteenth-century history writing.  Instead, imitation, personal pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’ 
and other deictic expressions are a constant and constitutive element of conversational 
story-telling.  Because of his strictly oppositional and purified concepts of narrative and 
discourse, White is able to ignore this whole sphere of bottom-up narrativity.  Of course, 
it would be a tough project to demonstrate how children, in telling their stories for 
example, are narrativizing their experiences with the help of plot structures flowing down 
from comedy, tragedy, romance and irony.   
 
Confusions of a traveller 
 
Thus far, I hope to have demonstrated that ‘narrative’ has not travelled around in the form 
of an intact, unchanging concept.  Even during the era of structuralist narratology, there 
were already significant differences and shifts in the conceptualizing of narrative.  The 
narrative that was inscribed as a part of the ‘narrativist’ project in historiography, was 
already something other than the dominant thread within narratology.  On its travels to 
the social sciences and psychology, the borderlines of the concept seem to collapse for 
three parallel reasons.  Not so infrequently, scholars have straightforwardly resorted to 
everyday concepts and claimed that everybody already knows story and narrative, which 
now were typically used interchangeably.  This liberal way of using the terms indicates, 
secondly, a broken contact from literary narratology, which in turn has been excessively 
fascinated with defining the terms ‘story’ and ‘narrative’ and in making a clear 
distinction between them (see, for example, Abbott, 2002; Richardson, 2000; Tammi, 
2006).  The third reason for the disappearing conceptual borderlines can be found in the 
metaphorical discourse on narrative, and the concomitant (and huge) broadening of the 
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range of reference of the concept.  I return to this dilemma later, while testing this 
discourse with the help of postclassical narratology.   
 
The narrative turn in social sciences, in other words, has not generated a sustained 
theoretical tradition by discussing its key concepts.  The ideal edification of such 
discourse would neither be in a forthcoming orthodoxy nor consensus, rather such 
discourse might help to reflect the narrative heritage.  The shortage of such conceptual 
discourse becomes evident with my next example of the postmodernist approach.  David 
Boje, in opening his book on narrative methods in organizational research, offers new 
conceptual innovations: 
 
Traditionally story has been viewed as less than narrative.  Narrative requires plot, 
as well as coherence.  To narrative theory, story is folksy, without emplotment, a 
simple telling of chronology.  I propose ‘antenarrative.’  Ante narrative is the 
fragmented, non-linear, incoherent, collective, unplotted and pre-narrative 
speculation, a bet.  To traditional narrative methods antenarrative is an improper 
storytelling, a wager that a proper narrative can be constituted.  Narrative tries to 
stand elite, to be above story.  (Boje, 2001, p. 1, emphasis added) 
 
In the literary tradition, ‘story’ has generally been understood as the sequence of events 
the receiver can infer by reading the narrative ‘discourse’ or text.  It has been ‘less’ than 
narrative only in an extremely technical sense; the accurate expression might rather be ‘a 
fundamental element of narrative.’  As mentioned earlier, most social scientists have used 
the terms as synonyms.  No tradition at all thus seems to support Boje’s bold claim.   
 
Boje locates ‘narrative’ and ‘story’ on the same epistemological level (e.g. not seeing 
‘story’ as a result of mental processing of the existing narrative discourse) but 
understands them as different parts of the process.  ‘Narrative’ requires plot and 
coherence (hence, is suspicious), while ‘story’, this traditionally inferred sequence of 
events, is now “without emplotment, a simple telling of chronology.”  Boje’s hectic 
process of re-defining concepts foregrounds the third Skinnerian level, the range of 
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possible appraisal of concepts.  Boje follows White in his conceptual purification by 
attesting that narratives cannot be either coherent or fragmented, no, what is needed for 
Boje’s postmodern theory is a purified concept of ‘antenarrative’ for those discursive 
units which do not embody the questionable element of emplotment (a term coming from 
White, and referring ultimately to the choice of one of the neoclassical ‘plot-structures’).   
 
Possibly the most risible element of the quote resides in the obvious narrativization (to 
employ a Whitean term) of the conceptual setting by claiming that narrative “tries to 
stand elite, to be above story.”  Mieke Bal indeed suggested that we should understand 
concepts as dynamic; nevertheless, she hardly considered transforming the mental and 
discursive tools as living characters, actants, or attributing to them devious and 
despicable attitudes towards our favourite folksy terms.  Amazingly, Boje activates some 
of the most questionable features of ‘narrativized’ thought (e.g. renders concepts as 
actants), in order to use them in the fight against narrative.   
 
To conclude, concepts have indeed travelled to new fields of study but they have hardly 
remained intact.  The terms, in contrast, travel more swiftly than their conceptual 
contents.  This supports the birth of different local theories using the same terms with 
entirely different conceptual contents. I next turn to a theme which exhibits a vast 
extension of the range of reference of the concept.   
 
Narrative as a metaphor 
 
The profusion of narrative metaphors is one of the characteristic features of the whole 
narrative turn in social sciences and psychology.  Such metaphors as “living out 
narratives” (MacIntyre, 1984) and “life as narrative” (Bruner, 1987) were crucial for the 
progress of the narrative turn in psychology and social sciences.  Partly replacing the 
vocabulary of experiment or survey study, for example, ‘narrative’ offered a plethora of 
new terms.  Along these lines, Bruner (1987, p. 17) suggests the Burkean pentad of agent, 
agency, scene, purpose and instrument (Burke, 1945).  From the very beginning, this 
metaphorical discourse also promised to explain personal continuity and coherence with 
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the help of narrative.  “There is no way of founding my identity – or lack of it – on the 
psychological continuity or discontinuity of the self.  The self inhabits a character whose 
unity is given as the unity of a character” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 217).  Closely related with 
this figural approach has been the massive extension of narrative’s possible range of 
reference.  After this explosion, it has become usual and helpful to make a distinction 
between narrative in a “narrow” and “broad” sense (Rimmon-Kenan, 2006; Ryan, 2005).  
The debates concern such substantial issues as narratives as representations versus 
ontological narrativity, and the whole relationship between life and narratives.   
 
The reasons for the metaphorical extension of narrative are easy to understand.  The 
structuralist narratology had radically elevated the hierarchical status of narrative, moved 
it from the province to the centre of the capital.  Barthes’ words made it ubiquitous: “All 
classes, all human groups, have their narratives, enjoyment of which is very often shared 
by men with different, even opposing, cultural backgrounds.  Caring nothing for the 
division between good and bad literature, narrative is international, transcultural: it is 
simply there, like life itself” (Barthes, 1977, p. 79).  Like life itself, indeed, the invitation 
for metaphors of life is already in place.  It was much easier to connect narrative with this 
abstract promise than to the partly exhaustive theoretical constructions that narratologists 
worked with.  Richard Rorty (1989) has aptly seen the relevance of new vocabularies for 
scholarly revolutions.  New terms in new contexts enable new thoughts to appear and 
they did.  Thus the travel of narrative vocabulary as such, before and without deeper 
conceptual considerations, encouraged new thinking.  Theories travel only with some 
difficulty and hard work (Bal’s ‘costs’ enter the game here), while the terms fly more 
fluently as ‘empty signifiers’.  Narrative and story became the kind of terms that scholars, 
journalists, politicians and business people equally started to retrofit for all kinds of 
uses.7   Rimmon-Kenan (2006) has discussed a number of such perplexing uses.  When 
authors became tired of writing about Marx’s theories, they nevertheless were able to 
                                                 
7 Jennifer Egan, in her Pulitzer Prize-winning novel The Visit from the Goon Squad, suggests a possible end 
of the attraction.  One of the younger characters writes a dissertation on words that can only be used within 
quotation marks: “English was full of empty words – ‘friend’ and ‘real’ and ‘story’ and ‘change’ – words 
that had been shucked of their meanings and reduced to husks” (Egan 2010, p. 324).   
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discuss his narrative of exploitation.  There is no shortage of theory books talking about 
narratives of this and that without ever revealing any explicit narrative representation.   
 
In what follows, my focus will be on the particular metaphorical connection between life 
and narrative.  How helpful is the metaphorical language for current narrative theory?  
Did the metaphorical extension of narrative language thematize new issues that the old, 
strictly representational theory did not exactly discuss?  Finally, is it possible or fruitful 
to refresh the “life as narrative” metaphor with the help of a postclassical understanding 
of narrative?  These are big questions to address in one chapter.  Rather than solving 
them, I suggest a series of conceptual clarifications and distinctions in order to help grasp 
the obvious tension between narrow and broad meanings of narrative.  As a point of 
departure, I claim that there is a significant difference between the argument that 
narrative is a vital and irrefutable element of human existence, as for example Hardy 
(1968), MacIntyre (1984), Bruner (1990) and Mark Freeman and Jens Brockmeier (this 
volume) have suggested; and the position which takes narrative as a metaphor of life – as 
MacIntyre (1984), David Carr (1986), Theodore Sarbin (1986) and Jerome Bruner (1987) 
have proposed.  My claim is that the first position is possible and even easier to warrant 
without the metaphorical obliteration of the distinction between life and narrative.   
 
Let us return to Louis Mink, and his famous dictum “Stories are not lived but told” 
(Mink, 1987, p. 60).  Mink, as a historian who is primarily preoccupied with the issue of 
how to write historical prose, cannot but understand narrative from the perspective of 
historical representation.  He is emphatically saying that stories do not exist in the world, 
before and independent of their telling.  Thanks to the debate, he nevertheless happens to 
invent a new metaphor.  More than ten years later, Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) turns his 
idiom upside down and starts theorizing about “living out narratives.”  His claim is by no 
means more modest than what Mink suggested: “It is because we all live out narratives in 
our lives and because we understand our lives in terms of the narratives that we live out 
that the form of narrative is appropriate for understanding the actions of others.  Stories 
are lived before they are told – except in the case of fiction” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 212).   
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However, what does it mean to live (out) narratives?  Before answering any such 
question we should firstly reflect upon the language games we are about to engage in.  If 
we think, following Mink (and White), that life is empty of narrativity and that stories are 
told strictly after the event, as distinct representations, then we are quite effectively 
foreclosing the whole issue of life and narrative.  If ‘living narratives’ means that humans 
use narratives in orienting themselves in life and action, the idiom makes a bit more 
sense.  By inviting a theme that Jens Brockmeier and Mark Freeman discuss further in 
this volume, I endeavour to say something about the temporal fabric of life.  For Mink, 
stories seem to be a kind of armchair issue.  In the morning, he goes out into the world, 
without a trace of narrativity, acts among and with other people, and comes home in the 
evening.  Having sat down, he can now tell stories about how life was out there.  We do 
not need to exert much effort to see the impossibility of such a frigid temporal 
partitioning.  Our hypothetical person has most likely told and, in turn, received a 
plethora of stories during the day.  A report on a fiercely spreading influenza may have 
changed his plans for the day entirely.  Before attending an important public event he has 
possibly envisioned himself encountering a number of infected people and considered his 
chances of getting ill and how his living through the illness would annoy and harm him.  
Telling and listening to stories thus has the capacity of constituting the core of a whole 
event or an experience.  In other words, narrative processing of the event and the world 
occurs in tandem with living and experiencing.  If we move from this example of old-
fashioned life to the living and telling with new social media, as Alexandra 
Georgakopoulou does in this volume, the co-existence of living and telling becomes even 
more tangible.  Mari Hatavara, in this volume, equally explores the ways in which 
narrative organization moves and lingers between the experiencing and the telling ‘I’ in 
autobiographical discourse.   
 
Yet, seen from his original perspective, Mink is still absolutely right.  The story he tells 
from his armchair in the evening is not the moment-by-moment ‘life’ he had lived earlier 
in the day, not to speak about whole lives or complex historical processes.  People may 
differ radically on how much they employ narrative processing in planning their lives, but 
literally no one simply enacts a pre-written life narrative.  As I later argue, the idea of 
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living out narratives contradicts fundamental narrative pragmatics.  Telling stories about 
life acquires its perspective, power and motivation from knowing more (and differently) 
than at the moment of living it. The two modes cannot be merged the way MacIntyre 
suggests, that is, without reducing telling to a pointless tautology.  Narratives as narrative 
representations always come afterwards, differ from the narrative plans, and are selective 
as regards the details, perspectives and voices, including the perspective of Mark 
Freeman’s (2010) hindsight.  Even at the very moment of experience – of an event taking 
place – the narrative processing, narrative interpretation and narrative speculations are to 
some degree active.  But the immediate narrative images and interpretations during this 
processing are still a long way from the finalized, stylised and situated narrative 




“But where is the narrative text?” is a regular remark by those exhausted literary scholars 
who have tried to follow these new, extended connotations of narrative (Tammi, 2006).  
We seem to be at an acute risk of cutting either narrative processing or the genuine 
narratives out of the picture.  After juggling between these ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ senses 
of narrative, Marie-Laure Ryan (2005) suggests a useful and powerful distinction.8  What 
Ryan maintains is this:  
 
The narrative potential of life can be accounted for by making a distinction between 
‘being a narrative’, and ‘possessing narrativity’.  The property of ‘being’ a narrative 
can be predicated off any semiotic object, whatever the medium, produced with the 
intent to create a response involving the construction of a story.  More precisely, it 
is the receiver’s recognition of this intent that leads to the judgment that a given 
semiotic object is a narrative [...], even though we can never be sure if sender and 
receiver have the same story in mind.  ‘Possessing narrativity’, on the other hand, 
                                                 
8 Perhaps, for the sake of debate, and in order to enhance its rhetorical power and visibility, we should 
borrow the famously violent metaphor from the history of social sciences and re-name the distinction 
‘Ryan’s guillotine’.   
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means being able to inspire a narrative response, whether or not in the text, if there 
is one, and whether or not an author designs the stimuli.  (2005, p. 347) 
  
Even this clear distinction starts to waver when Ryan comes to the more ephemeral part 
of ‘possessing narrativity.’  Nevertheless, the idea is clear: it is not helpful to refer to all 
the phenomena that have a narrative aspect as narratives.  ‘Life’ is not a semiotic object, 
thus it cannot be ‘a narrative’, whatever the amount of narrativity involved in our 
everyday lives].  Similarly, such idioms as “having a narrative” (Schechtman, 1996, pp. 
105–119) should, accordingly, and before testing their accuracy, be translated into the 
more specific form of “having narrative as a semiotic object.”  The distinction also 
obviously suggests that such idioms as ‘living out narratives’ need to be reformulated.  
Every single use of the term narrative, as a noun, should be tested by the question: “But 
where’s the narrative text (semiotic object)?”   
 
If we now accept that narratives are indeed semiotic objects and obviously 
representations, one further question arises.  Does this choice entirely exclude the aspect 
of narrative ontology (Somers, 1994)?  Not at all.  Even if every single narrative could be 
called a semiotic object and, as such, constitute representations of something else, these 
very same narratives have the potential of constituting both minds and social realities.  
Narratives are real in their consequences, whether they try to capture fictional or lived 
experience.  Equally, narrative processing, the ‘hermeneutical imperative’, can still be 
understood to constitute an essential part of human existence (see Brockmeier and 
Freeman, this volume).   
 
Life as postclassical narrative? 
 
Several powerful metaphors have been launched since the outset of the narrative turn in 
social research.  “Living out narratives” (MacIntyre, 1984) was followed by “life as 
narrative” and “becoming a narrative” (Bruner, 1987), “storied lives” (Rosenwald & 
Ochberg, 1992), “inner narrative” (Hänninen, 2004) and “having a narrative” 
(Schechtman, 1996, 2007).  
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These metaphors need to be reconsidered for the simple reason that they are metaphors.  
“Metaphor is a device for seeing something in terms of something else”, says Kenneth 
Burke (1945, p. 503).  Metaphor is a cognitive and discursive figure which offers a 
perspective to something that is usually difficult to grasp and conceptualize, something 
which is ephemeral or ambiguous – as for example life, love, trauma and death.  The 
problem for this chapter resides precisely here.  The first term, narrative, is automatically 
presumed to be known, conventional and familiar.  In other words, all the narrative 
metaphors presume narrative as being known and shift the whole attention to the second 
term, be it ‘life’, ‘memory’, or ‘organization’.  This orientation has brought fruitful 
results, but it is simultaneously a trap.  What if we still did not know what we mean by 
‘narrative’?   
 
Because attention within the metaphorical genre was directed primarily to things other 
than narrative, the shared conventionality as regards narrative has remained powerful.  
Mink (1987), MacIntyre (1984), Carr (1986) and Bruner (1987) do not differ 
substantially from each other when it comes to understanding narrative.  The vision is 
principally top-down, from art to the everyday, from myths and Neo-classical genres 
down to individual life stories.  The dominant view is textual in the sense that a person’s 
narratives are not presumed to change considerably from situation to situation (I return to 
this variation with my fictional example, below).  Narrative is thus predominantly 
understood as an inherited form which is capable of transmitting the cultural heritage to 
acting individuals.   
 
My thought experiment builds, firstly, on turning the direction of attention back to 
narrative and, secondly, on updating the way narrative is understood, and of looking at 
some of the metaphors again after this conceptual reshaping.  I use the term ‘postclassical 
narrative’ as a relatively broad term and freely derived from the discussions of 
contemporary, ‘postclassical narratology’, a term that David Herman (1999, pp. 2–3) 
suggested, and which has since then been taken up by several authors (e.g. Nünning, 
2003; Alber & Fludernik, 2010).  Even while defining his term, Herman suggests that the 
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“result is a host of new perspectives on the forms and functions of narrative itself” (p. 3).  
Two words are of particular significance here: “forms” and “functions”.  Contemporary 
narrative theory does not, according to this programme, find its mere objective in the 
study of “the narrative form itself,” as Mink (1987, p. 186), has suggested, in his role as a 
representative of his period.   
 
The theme of narrative functions came to the social research of narratives with William 
Labov and Joshua Walezky’s (1967/87; Labov, 1972) model of oral narratives.  The 
authors tried and were successful in construing a structural model; nevertheless, they also 
had a keen interest in the narrative functions, in the way narratives accounted for lived 
experience.  Moreover, they already thematized the narrative dialectic between 
expectations and experience.  Complete narratives, for Labov, are no sheer records of 
what happened, they actively comment on what did not happen and what could have 
happened.  It is this “subjunctive” element that Bruner (1990, pp. 53–54) later elevates as 
one necessary part of “good stories”.  Bruner theorizes further the sphere of the socially 
expected, and calls it “folk psychology” (pp. 14–15).  Based on this sphere of 
“canonicity”, Bruner can now redefine the function of narrative, and he does this 
emphatically several times in the book: “Note that it is only when constituent beliefs in 
folk psychology are violated that narratives are constructed” (p. 39); “Stories achieve 
their meanings by explicating deviations from the ordinary in a comprehensible form – 
by providing the ‘impossible logic’ discussed in the preceding section” (p. 47, emphasis 
added).  This element of breaking up canonicity or world-disruption is equally built into 
Herman’s recent model of prototypical narrativity (Herman, 2009a).  I am afraid that this 
major proposal by Bruner (1990) has largely been dismissed by his followers who, 
instead, have preferred to replicate the dictums from his earlier, heavily metaphorical 
essay (Bruner, 1987; see Hyvärinen, 2008).   
 
This functional perspective on narrativity creates (severe) new problems for the 
metaphors.  The first is the helpful distinction between folk psychological expectations 
and narratives.  Bruner is not entirely systematic in using this new language of folk 
psychology, since he also writes about folk psychological narratives.  Using Ryan’s 
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distinction, it would however be possible to say that the folk psychological knowing 
incorporates narrativity, by way of condensing the knowledge about the canonical and 
culturally expected sequences of events in different contexts, but is not as such articulated 
as narratives.  Narratives make visible this canonicity by using it systematically as the 
shadow or point of comparison, as the background against which the narrative is made 
relevant and tellable.  For lack of better terms, I suggest here a distinction between folk-
psychological scripts and narratives proper.  Folk psychology is certainly used and lived 
out, but narratives are told when the expected plans have eventually failed.   
 
From a functional point of view, narratives are comments, comments on life and social 
expectations.  As comments, narratives may be reflective, recuperative, belittling or 
reclaiming.  But they are, at any rate, doing something as regards living and its terms.  
This functional reading resonates strongly with Kuisma Korhonen’s analysis of what 
really matters in narrative therapies, which, as he has it, is more the telling of the story 
than any particular kind of narrative or narrative form as such (Korhonen, in this 
volume).  To say the least: proper narratives necessarily need the analytic distinction 
between living and telling to be able to perform their function as comments.  For this 
pragmatic reason I also reject the metaphor of ‘having a narrative’ as a fundamental 
building block of personality.  For one thing, I do not fully understand what the idiom 
means, since I do not personally ‘have’ a narrative.  Narratives are, from the suggested 
functional perspective, always doing something; they are told and received in situations.  
As Walsh (2010, p. 36) has it, “stories, of whatever kind, do not merely appear, but are 
told.”   
 
One of the largest, climatic changes, taking place during the move from classical to 
postclassical narratology concerns the shift from “text-centredness” to “post-classical 
context orientation” (Nünning, 2003, p. 243).  This is foregrounded in the work of the 
rhetorical school (Smith, 1981; Phelan, 2005, 2007), and it is equally a key element 
within Herman’s new narrative prototype (2009a). Most of the narrative metaphors, 
however, build on a heavily textual image of relatively permanent, inner and context-
unrelated narratives.  Within this imagery, people are ‘living out’ and ‘having’ some 
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vague version of Bildungsroman in their mind, whereas the context-orientation opens up 
the field for different narratives in different contexts and for different purposes.9  If, in 
contrast, the telling of a life story is used for the purpose of radical self-reflection and 
investigation, such phenomena as fragmentation and lack of coherence may serve the 
purpose even without having – at the moment of telling – any second-degree coherence 
awaiting the interpreter.   
 
Life On Chesil Beach 
 
To achieve a firmer understanding of the complexities of life and narrative, I turn to 
discuss Ian McEwan’s (2007) novel On Chesil Beach.  This novel tells the story of the 
ten-hour marriage of two young people, Edward and Florence, in the England of 1962.  
But why use fictional material to discuss a problem which mostly concerns narrative 
studies focusing on non-fiction?  My primary reason for using fiction is to use it as a 
laboratory of human minds in context.  Fictional material has the capacity to be highly 
sensitive and public at the same time, giving better chances to elaborate ideas about 
living narratives.  My reading will focus on the way the characters make sense of their 
lives with the help of narrative scripts, and how these scripts fail.  David Herman (2009b) 
suggests an apposite idiom of “storied minds” while discussing McEwan’s novel.  
Edward and Florence have indeed storied their minds through and through; they have 
memories of their own coming to mind during the evening, they have jointly scripted 
their future, their jobs and careers, children and family; yet they subscribe to drastically 
contrasting scripts about the wedding night itself.  The final quarrel on the beach can also 
be read as a failed attempt at negotiating between their diverting scripted futures after the 
joint failure in the bedroom.10 
 
                                                 
9 “…it is justified in speaking of life as a story in its nascent state, and so of life as an activity and passion 
in search of a narrative,” writes Paul Ricoeur (1991, p. 29).  I am afraid that the image of one (and 
covering) Bildungsroman is unwarranted even here.  Why talk about narrative in the singular?  
 
10 This reading focuses on Florence and her story.  My purpose is by no means to mark her ‘guilty’ of the 
break up or anything else.  In her case, the contradiction between the storied mind and bodily memory and 
body-based action is exceptionally telling for the purposes of this chapter.  If my ethical criticism indeed 
has a target, it is the trauma and the perpetrator.   
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For Herman, narratological work on temporality “suggests how texts like McEwan’s 
allow the motivations, structure, and consequences of actions to be from multiple 
positions of time.  Stories, this research suggests, are a primary technology for making 
sense of how things unfold in time” (p. 56). Herman also points out another important 
feature of novels such as McEwan’s, “the two-layered environment for modeling action” 
(p. 60).  During their encounter and discussion on Chesil Beach on their wedding night, 
both Edward and Florence go back and forth to their own singular memories.  Quite 
clearly, both of them are using stories as a “primary technology for making sense of how 
things unfold in time” (p. 56).  What makes the novel particularly interesting for my 
purposes is the second level of the third-person narration which informs the reader of 
aspects that the characters themselves are unaware of, at least at the moment of the event 
itself.  The narrator allows us to know more than would realistically be possible in a non-
fictional context, yet leaving such huge gaps that the reader cannot but face the same 
insecurity as the open world tends to exhibit.   
 
It is this ‘two-layered environment’ which enables a nuanced discussion about the 
persistent theme of life and narrative.  One of the fine paradoxes of narrative fiction 
resides exactly here: one level of narrative (the narratorial/authorial) enables the reader to 
see limits of narrative and the storied ‘technology for making sense’ (on the character-
level narration).   
 
The beginning of the novel is thickly populated with the plans and stories Florence and 
Edward tell and process.  “Their plan was to change into rough shoes after supper and 
walk on the shingle between the sea and the lagoon…” (p. 5); “And they had so many 
plans, giddy plans, heaped up before them in the misty future…Where and how they 
would live, who their close friends would be, his job in her father’s firm, her musical 
career and what to do with the money her father had given them” (pp. 5–6).  Experienced 
readers of McEwan’s work already know that these plans will not be realized.  As 
readers, we may also be tempted to think that the characters possibly use this dense 
scripting as a method of overcoming their existential uncertainty in the new life situation.  
Of course the characters also story their backgrounds.  “One of their favorite topics was 
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their childhoods, not so much the pleasures as the fog of comical misconceptions from 
which they had emerged, and the various parental errors and outdated practices they 
could now forgive” (p. 6).  And so on and on.  
 
The whole course of the wedding night is structured by the drastically opposite 
expectations Florence and Edward nurture.  They have both drafted a script for the 
evening; unfortunately the scripts do not meet or become communicable.  Nevertheless, 
there is one joint element in their plans, and it is worry.  The existence of the worry 
renders them even more vulnerable, less communicative and even more likely to drift out 
of their scripts.  Florence is totally frightened about the forthcoming sexual intercourse; 
for Edward, it signifies the absolute fulfilment of his dreams about Florence.  In her 
mind, Florence thought that “there was something profoundly wrong with her” (pp. 8–9), 
nevertheless there is a passing moment during which she almost finds Edward’s intimate 
touch intriguingly pleasurable (p. 87).  This passing moment is not an option that is a part 
of her script, nor does it profile afterwards, that is, in her new story on the beach.  The 
characters have thickly storied minds, yet there is this strong unstoried, non-narrated 
residue of life intervening occasionally as the narrator’s story proceeds.  There is also a 
constant, perplexing flow of powerful sensual perceptions, odours, voices, touches, going 
on in Florence’s mind, speaking often about a traumatized mind.  By following Lars-
Christer Hydén’s idea of the relevance of bodily presence, I try to read out the 
discrepancies between the characters’ bodily presence and their storied minds (see 
Hydén, this volume).   
 
Florence’s difficult balancing act between her dread and her wish to please Edward in the 
bedroom collapses totally after Edward’s premature ejaculation.  “But now she was 
incapable of repressing her primal disgust, her visceral horror at being doused in fluid, in 
slime from another body.  In seconds it had turned icy on her skin in the sea breeze, and 
yet, just as she knew it would, it seemed to scald her” (p. 105).  It is her body sensing 
(“primal disgust”, “visceral horror,” “scalding her”), talking and knowing (“just as she 
knew it would”), and not her delicately storied mind that is doing the talking here.  
Earlier on, she had heard additional voices, as if musical instruments, but now the odour 
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of sperm is familiar in spite of her sexual inexperience  “…it’s intimate starchy odour, 
which dragged with it the stench of a shameful secret” (p. 106).  Florence panics and 
rushes out of the bedroom, leaving a totally shamed Edward behind to develop his fury.  
Immediately prior to her escape, there are the important words of the narrator: “She was 
two selves – the one who flung the pillow down in exasperation, the other who looked on 
and hated herself for it. […] She could hate him for what he was witnessing now and 
would never forget” (p. 106).  This confusing two-fold reality of hers is later edited away, 
as she re-stories her experience before and during the quarrel.   
 
The final crash of different life scripts takes place during the angry exchange on the 
beach.  Again, it is not merely a clash between two contrasting life narratives; instead we 
have two hormonally excited young bodies on the beach, furious Edward and bodily 
withdrawing, terrified Florence.  In a sense, their excited bodies are what control their 
last attempt at conversing.  They have just shared a huge mutual failure and Florence’s 
violent escape from the bedroom.  It is remarkable that both Edward and Florence are 
incapable and reluctant to unpack the moment of failure and to give relevant accounts of 
what was exactly so hurtful in it.  Florence even seems to misdirect Edward’s 
interpretations, to guide him towards a much more (folk psychological and) conventional 
reading of the event: 
 
‘Look, this is ridiculous. It was unfair of you to run like that.’  [says Edward] 
‘Was it?’   
‘In fact, it was bloody unpleasant.’   
‘Oh really? Well, it was bloody unpleasant, what you did.’   
‘Meaning what?’   
She had her eyes shut as she said it.  ‘You know exactly what I mean.’  She would 
torture herself with the memory of her part in this exchange, but now she added, ‘It 
was absolutely revolting.’   
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 “She heard herself say smoothly. ‘I know failure when I see it’” (p. 144).   
 
This passage is not only a prime example of failed mind-reading which goes on more or 
less throughout the quarrel; it is also an example of tactical play with this misreading.  
Florence and Edward were in love with each other and had talked hours and hours 
together, yet they were almost completely unable to read the other’s mind on the beach.  
What was so deeply “unpleasant” in what Edward had done?  Just a while ago, Florence 
had abhorred the whole idea of sexual intercourse, now she leads Edward to believe that 
his “absolutely revolting” gesture was indeed his premature ejaculation: ‘You know 
exactly what I mean.’  Florence, unlike the reader, does not even know how embarrassing 
and humiliating the issue of ejaculation was for Edward, but she is quick to resort to folk 
psychological resources.  At the same time, she is obviously pushing away the memory of 
the almost remembered instance of abuse, the disturbance her body was just about to 
reveal.  A genuine transference takes place when the “intimate starchy odour, which 
dragged with it the stench of a shameful secret” now marks Edward, makes his 
ejaculation responsible for “a shameful secret”.  This bodily drama simply exceeds the 
frames of ‘life as narrative’.   
 
A moment later, when they both have calmed down to a degree, Florence makes her 
proposal of marriage of love without sex, offering Edward the full freedom to have 
sexual relationships with other women (pp. 153–157).  My students11 tend to find 
Florence an unconventional person in contrast to the conventionality of Edward’s 
traditional family values.  On my reading, both Florence and Edward are merely 
returning to their original scripts about their marriage, love, and sex and find them now 
entirely incommensurable.  Edward is not primarily interested in maintaining 
conventionality but in having sex, and he would probably have been happy with an open 
relationship with the option of having sex with the woman he still adored (and who, at the 
                                                 
11 I have twice co-convened a course on family research in the University of Tampere.  Students read the 
novel and write their first essay before the series of lectures, another after the course.  We had to repeat the 
course due to its popularity.   
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moment of the quarrel, was practically the only visible partner).  This is how Florence 
begins her talk:    
 
‘That I’m pretty hopeless, absolutely hopeless at sex.  Not only am I no good at it, I 
don’t seem to need it like other people, like you do.  It just isn’t something that is 
part of me.  (p. 153)  
 
This is indeed a sadly storied mind.  She is effectively telling the quality of being 
“hopeless in sex” as an integral part of her self and identity, rather than as temporary or 
something imposed on her.  The recent memory of the passing moment of pleasure is 
already edited away, as is the bodily memory of what really revolted her in the bedroom 
failure.  Florence insists on living out her projected narrative of marriage without sex, and 
just because of being so fixed – identified – with  this narrative she is unable to achieve 
the love of the person she most wanted to have, and thus to live out her narrative.  The 
enraged Edward, similarly, is so fixed on his script and his disappointment that it takes 
several decades for him to fully see his loss.  Only in hindsight, drastically too late to 
change anything, is he able to see some of the effects of his un-restrained rage.   
 
As a fine tribute and direct reference to Sigmund Freud’s (1905/2002) classic text The 
Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious, the only visible rupture in Florence’s evasion 
of the true reasons for her revulsion of the bedroom failure is articulated in the form of an 
intended joke: “Perhaps I should be psychoanalysed.  Perhaps what I really need to do is 
kill my mother and marry my father” (p. 153).  Trauma speaks here, but neither she nor 
Edward is sensitive or discursively12 competent enough to hear the message.  And who 
would, at the age of 22?   
 
McEwan’s novel portrays two young people who insist on storying their minds and lives.  
Using metaphorical language, both of them try to live out their narratives.  Equally, they 
share the attitude of ‘having a narrative’ and sticking to it despite it having become 
                                                 
12 McEwan is particularly interested in and careful with the (non)existence and use of different discourses 
in the early 1960s.  Therapeutic and psychoanalytic languages were foreign to people coming from the 
lower middle class, as Edward was. 
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obviously unrealizable.  Because of the incommensurability of the stories, the two scripts 
collide in the bedroom, and later on the beach.  The course of the life does not follow 
these scripts, and both individuals must face a devastating disappointment.  The narrator 
expertly opens up a chasm between the intended, ‘storied life’, and the whole rush of 
mental and bodily life, leaving the life narratives and scripted futures helpless before the 
contingencies of actual life.  Life exceeds the narratives which the characters try so hard 
to live out, and the bodily realities surpass these conscious storied minds.  Disregarding 
the chasm between life and narratives, the narrative processing has no end.  Nowhere in 
the novel is the necessity of narrative processing expressed as compellingly as in the 
short comment on Florence’s future thoughts: “She would torture herself with the 
memory of her part in this exchange...” (p. 144).  However perplexing and painful the life 
experience, the narrative processing keeps trying to capture it.   
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